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 In recent years, many instances of positive collective emotional manifestations of widely 
shared forms of pride, joy, and happiness have been reported in international media. 
Reactions to Obama’s election victory in 2008 included pride, excitement, and euphoria 
amongst supporters within the USA and worldwide. In 2010, the successful rescue of 
trapped miners in Chile produced contrasting emotions of national pride within the coun-
try and transnational collective joy in the global audience following the drama. In Japan, 
the women’s soccer team triumph in the 2011 FIFA World Cup produced widespread hap-
piness only a few months at er the nuclear disaster and devastating tsunami. In the Ivory 
Coast in April 2011, supporters of rebel Alassane Ouattara celebrated in the streets at er 
the UN coni rmed the capture and surrender of former President Gbagbo. Finally, 80% of 
the 1002 Britons (aged 16 years and over) surveyed about the 2012 Olympics felt that the 
“games has made people more proud to be British”—although 53% also agreed with the 
statement: “the ef ect will be short-lived” (BBC, 2012). 
 h ese instances of intense collective positive emotion represent only a brief list of events 
that require greater investigation, understanding, and explanation by an interdisciplinary 
combination of work from philosophy, sociology, cultural studies, political science, and 
social psychology. Although multiple perspectives can be taken toward the emotions that 
occur in groups, it is important to identify some common features. Even when groups 
(or subgroups) are ephemeral, collective emotion is felt by most members of the group. 
h is demonstrates not only the means by which a group is identii ed by other groups 
and how group members conceive themselves, but also displays common group inter-
ests, values, and aims. It is useful to be aware of: (1) the wide variety of groups in which 
collective emotions can occur; (2) the degree of commitment, attachment, or identii ca-
tion involved; and (3)  the types of collectives that af ord collective emotions. Salmela 
(forthcoming) reminds us that collective emotions can occur on the basis of voluntary 
commitment to “teams, fan clubs, social clubs, bands and orchestras, theater ensembles, 
political parties, religious sects, as well as other identity groups that focus on gender, 
sexuality, health, environment, spirituality, or ethnicity.” Furthermore, events ai  rming 
18_9780199659180_c18.indd   266 10/29/2013   9:01:51 PM
WHAT IS COLLECTIVE PRIDE? 267
a collective’s success, status, prestige, or dominance can generate collective pride in local 
and transnational “social movements of all kinds, from progressive to reactionary, radi-
cal to conservative, identity-based to heterogeneous, dif use to hierarchical” (Fominaya, 
2010, p. 401). 
 For some groups, however, the notion that identity is a matter of choice is inconceivable 
and is, therefore, not simply a matter of their level of group identii cation. For example, 
when relations to a group are conceived in terms of “blood ties” rather than the contin-
gencies of culture ― as is the case for many Germans on the extreme right (Miller-Idriss, 
2006)—the perceived absence of options can further strengthen the intensity of group 
triumphs and failures. Where a group’s identity is based on the notion of a i xed and spe-
cial, unique or elevated status, the predominant collective emotions are likely to be nega-
tive and narcissistic because maintaining dominance and status is paramount (Golec de 
Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009). In contrast, members of groups with 
social and geographical mobility as well as degree of identity pluralism may be less likely 
to feel intense collective emotions like group pride. 
 Collective pride includes, but should not to be equivocated with, collective self-esteem 
(Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) or a positive social identity because the latter phenomena 
are based primarily on what individuals feel on the basis of group ai  liations. For exam-
ple, people can take rel ected glory from the achievements and attributes of groups with 
which they personally identify, are associated with through networks of relations, or with 
which they have an identii able membership. h ese feelings can reveal much about struc-
tural relations of unequal status and power between groups, but for the moment col-
lective pride is simply understood to occur at dif erent levels, from family, institutional, 
organizational, and regional groups to ephemeral or established national and transna-
tional communities. In the i rst part of the chapter, skeptical points about collective pride 
are confronted and dif erences are highlighted between this and other discrete collective 
positive emotions. In the second section, background issues such as structural features of 
collective pride, intergroup relations and historical considerations are explored in terms 
of aggregative, network and cultural models. In the third section, three examples of col-
lective pride are examined: increased national pride in Germany during the 2010 World 
Cup, patriotic displays in the USA following September 11, 2001 (Collins, 2004; Skitka, 
2005), and collective pride in “intractable conl icts” (Bar-Tal, 2007; Halperin, Chapter 19, 
this volume). 
 What is collective pride? 
 Collective pride is exemplii ed by the widespread positive emotion of a crowd celebrating 
a sporting or political triumph (i.e., occasions that people recall when something special 
or important occurred or was achieved which is taken by group members to “say some-
thing positive about us”) and sensed by a person like a successful sports representative 
when he or she is the object of group pride and admiration. Each reader of this chapter 
can probably recall their own personal (rather than vicarious) experiences of group pride, 
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but it is perhaps instances of ambivalence, denial, emotional self-regulation or resistance 
with regard to these group feelings that are most relevant to the skeptical arguments we 
turn to now. 
 A i rst point of skepticism about the existence of any collective emotion—whether posi-
tive or negative, discrete or dif use—is to note that there is no unii ed “thing” that could 
consciously experience such an af ect. For instance, Pettigrove and Parsons (2012) briel y 
conjure and then summarily dismiss the picture of a societal “super-agent.” Combining 
a reference to h omas Hobbes’s classic text of 1651 with an imagined extension of 
i rst-person psychological unity to a collective, they retort: “h ose inclined to speak of 
collective emotions are not positing a self-conscious Leviathan” (p. 2). No “collective sub-
ject” is therefore needed to make sense of emotions that are genuinely collective (Salmela, 
2012) but not necessarily rel exive in a manner analogous to individual self-evaluative 
emotion. Huebner (2011) expresses a similar skepticism about collective emotions but 
he still maintains: “some groups exhibit the computational complexity and informational 
integration required for being in genuinely emotional states” (p. 89). h e conclusion that 
can be drawn from these initial considerations is that “arguments for extended cogni-
tion.  . . do not generalize to arguments for an extended conscious mind” (Clark, 2009, 
p. 472; see also Slaby, Chapter 3, this volume). 
 Extension of any representation of i rst-person uses of “pride” and “hubris” to 
i rst-person and third-person plural examples should occur only at er careful investiga-
tion and conceptual qualii cation. When people express what “we” feel and talk about 
in relation to other people and “their” emotions, it is important to represent clearly the 
meaningfulness (or otherwise) and potential accountability of the relevant ascription 
and utterance. In this respect, ontologically dubious pictures of “super-agents” or “group 
mind” contrast with occasions when an emotion is the product of the interactions and 
relationships between members of a group focused on a particular object (although the 
range of objects of collective pride can, of course, be quite concrete physical instantia-
tions or abstract and imagined). First-person plural expressions and third-person plural 
ascriptions rel ect taken-for-granted linguistic and interactional constructions in daily 
life. Billig (1995), for example, emphasizes the repetitive l agging of nationality through 
deictic linguistic forms such as “we,” “us,” and “our,” noting that this banal nationalism is 
widespread, taken-for-granted and “not to be corralled into the sport pages or the banal 
clichés of vote-seeking politicians” (p.  11). Billig also considers whether occasions of 
strong emotion forge, sustain and thereby explain forms of collective identity in nation 
states. He suggests that on occasions when the state “celebrates itself.   .  . sentiments of 
patriotic emotions, which are the rest of the year have to be kept far from the business of 
ordinary life, can surge forth” (pp. 44–45). Billig clearly does not deny the existence of col-
lective emotions, but he questions whether intense, widely-shared feelings are important 
to the everyday construction of group belonging, collective identity and dispositions to 
feel group-based emotions. 
 A second source of skepticism focuses on occasions when ascriptions of collective 
emotion are conceptually inappropriate. Analyzing examples of collective fear, Huebner 
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(2011) concludes that it is possible to extend “emotional states to other collectivities pro-
vided they have the right sort of organization” (p. 116). Huebner argues that the “compu-
tational systems governing the behavior of the collectivity” (p. 116) which are not evident 
when focusing on the individuals involved are necessary and sui  cient for all collective 
emotions. Paraphrasing and extending Huebner, it seems reasonable to examine cases in 
which collectives are organized in ways that allow for specii c forms of emotional rep-
resentation; that is, to consider the specii c forms of organization that dei ne emotions 
such as collective pride and distinguish them, for example, from same-valence emotions 
such as collective happiness and opposite-valence emotions like collective shame. But do 
particular discrete collective positive emotions really exist? For example, an estimated one 
million people attended a parade of Japan’s 2012 Olympic gold medal winners in Tokyo—
the i rst time this has happened—when they returned from the London games ( h e 
Guardian , 2012a). h is could simply be a dif use form of collective positivity or “ef er-
vescence” (Collins, 2004) even though it might be described in many other countries as 
national pride. Remarks such as “It delighted me how they lit ed the spirits of the Japanese 
people. It was truly wonderful” ( h e Guardian , 2012a) further suggest that the crowd was 
happy and appreciative rather than proud of “our” achievement. It might appear that col-
lective pride has not occurred if people do not organize themselves in ways that generate 
high levels of spontaneous positive expression (i.e., an intense collective self-related pride 
rather than a quiet satisfaction or appreciation) when they are together and close to the 
objects of their admiration. While the people in Tokyo may have experienced feelings of 
solidarity, enthusiasm, and agency from being part of the welcoming group, display rules 
against expressing national pride may have led to collective moderation of their emotions. 
 A third skeptical issue is whether people in such groups experience emotions of collec-
tive pride and solidarity that they would not otherwise feel. However, there is considera-
ble anecdotal and empirical support for emotional contagion of positive emotion through 
social processes of emotional sharing (Rimé, 2007). People do feel more when they are 
physically co-present in a group rather than alone (Collins, 2004) and this is a structural 
feature of pride because group members can sense when their reactions to events coordi-
nate with others to create group properties like noise level and their actions contribute to 
complex group behaviors such as chanting. 
 A fourth skeptical question is whether the history of a group really can af ect the emo-
tions of its members (Reysen & Branscombe, 2008). Collective pride ot en rel ects a 
history of relations between groups and it can represent a group’s preoccupation with rec-
ognition by a signii cant collective “other.” Countries that organize mega-sport events, for 
example, ot en take particular collective pleasure in showing international critics that “we 
were able to host a successful event.” In order to avoid individualism and reductionism 
about collective emotion, it is important not to place too much emphasis on personal cog-
nitions about a group’s history when explaining the organization that might distinguish 
collective pride from other positive group feelings because stories people share about sup-
porting national sporting representatives together with group narratives can also shape 
both individual and group emotions (e.g., national narratives; Sullivan, 2009). 
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 A i t h source of skepticism is whether group members can feel emotions for events 
they have not been directly involved in. With regard to collective pride, it is clear that peo-
ple take pride in the achievements of other group members without any personal respon-
sibility for the outcome. Miller-Idriss’s (2006) qualitative research in Germany shows that 
ambivalence about national pride is still common and, for some Germans, sharing in a 
national triumph is tantamount to claiming personal responsibility for the outcome. In 
other countries, personal responsibility is not regarded as an appropriate reason for some-
one only to  feel happy for rather than  proud of group representatives. Ot en it is enough 
simply to want them to succeed to be able to share in their subsequent success without 
also feeling guilt. Of course, it is also possible for an individual to take a national success 
as grounds for widely shared nationalistic feelings and hubristic remarks such as “now 
we’re back at the top where we belong.” On this view, even genuine achievements that peo-
ple celebrate might fuel subsequent group behavior and narratives of group superiority. 
 A i nal skeptical issue is whether collective pride is always positive. For example, Skey 
(2006) contrasts the notion of banal nationalism with what he tentatively describes as 
“ecstatic nationalism.” Crucially, he is aware that there are celebrations which have a dis-
tinctly mixed l avor with some appearing to be aggressive, dei ant, and based on superior-
ity rather than merely being joyful, happy, and expressive of satisfaction. Collective pride 
may mark out a subgroup with a dif erent national, ethnic, or political ideology, agenda, 
and interests. Skey’s emphasis on making explicit the connections between culture and 
power therefore recognizes that “some ecstatic events may act as forces for disunity within 
a wider society, although they promote solidarity within a particular section of the popu-
lation” (p.  152). Examples of questionable “ecstasy” include Americans celebrating the 
death of Osama bin Laden with chants of “U–S–A” outside the White House and “the 
Orangemen Parades that ‘celebrate’ Protestant hegemony in a divided Northern Ireland” 
(Skey, 2006, p. 152). h e feel of dif erent forms of positive collective emotion will be fur-
ther explored in specii c examples which include collective pride in conl ict situations and 
in relation to collective shame. 
 Aggregative, network, and cultural models 
of collective pride 
 Having addressed skepticism about collective pride, it is important to examine dif erent 
models of collective pride and similar emotions before analyzing specii c examples of col-
lective pride and collective hubris. 
 Aggregative models of collective pride 
 h e aggregative model implies that collective pride has no properties additional to 
those emotions felt and displayed by individuals. Increases in a group’s collective pride 
may therefore be judged on the basis of combined questionnaire responses to the items 
constituting measures of group-based feeling such as the Collective Self-Esteem scale 
(Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) or Collective Narcissism scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). 
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h e approach relies on statistical methods such as when averaged self-reports of national 
pride increase, but changes in emotional attitudes can be measured without capturing 
important features of collective emotion. For example, the 2006 World Cup hosted by 
Germany changed norms regulating the display of national symbols and the relationship 
between German citizens and their nation, but these societal and cultural changes are not 
evident in the statistical data. Kersting (2007), for example, analyzed representative Social 
Survey Data gathered before, during, and at er the World Cup and found, respectively, 
that before the 71% of Germans stated that they were “very proud” and “fairly proud,” 
during the two months of the 2006 World Cup this i gure increased to 78% percent and 
in the post-World Cup period “only 72% had a strong feeling of national pride” (p. 283). 
Although Kersting correctly concluded that “this phenomenon can only be explained by 
the euphoria existing during the World Cup” (p. 283), he did not present a model or theo-
retical explanation of the collective emotions that the World Cup generated. 
 Statistically informed judgments of mean levels of subjective well-being for a group, 
combined self-report measures of individual patriotic and nationalistic attitudes or 
national levels of happiness are not collective pride. h e aggregate model and its reliance 
on means self-report statistics risks misrepresenting internal relations between concepts 
such as collective pride, positive emotion, and communal well-being as external relations 
between measured variables of individual subjective well-being and pride felt in response 
to specii c events (e.g., sporting success; Hallmann, Breuer, & Kühnreich, 2013). 
 Another issue with aggregate models is that group-based emotion can be experienced 
in isolation as the residual ef ects of social structures. For instance, a central feature of 
intergroup emotion theory (IET; Ray, Mackie, & Smith, Chapter 16, this volume; Smith, 
Seger, & Mackie, 2007) is that “people who identify more strongly with a group should 
experience and express group emotions to a greater extent than weak identii ers, a predic-
tion that is particularly clear for positive group emotions (e.g., happiness, pride)” (p. 432). 
Smith and colleagues (2007) claim that feeling positive emotion will result in people 
showing “stronger biases favoring the ingroup over the outgroup” (p. 433). However, their 
further argument that “group pride motivates people to approach other ingroup mem-
bers or to increase their level of identii cation with the group” (p. 433) hints at forms of 
social organization and action tendencies specii c to collective pride such as the impulses 
to evoke stories of previous triumphs and to celebrate at sites of national signii cance. 
Accordingly, focusing on aggregates of individual properties fails to address crucial fea-
tures of context and background. Dispositions to sense and share in collective emotions 
that result from participation in community life do not arise only from a psychological 
process of identii cation. For example, someone in a crowd may experience solidarity and 
positive emotion because they share the crowd’s goals or values, but they may not fully 
share the intensity and nuances of the crowd’s emotions because their background is dif-
ferent. h is person would lack sensitivity to moments of signii cance for the crowd and 
would not be able to coordinate all of their spontaneous responses with them because 
they were not brought up with similar embodied values, shared memories and repertoires 
of specii c cultural knowledge. 
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 Network models of collective pride 
 Network approaches to emotions in groups and as properties of group organization 
are highlighted by Fowler and Christakis’s (2008) happiness research. h e connections 
between people can be examined (i.e., direct and indirect relationships) and network 
models can include geographical or temporal constraints on the spread of happiness 
through a social network. h e spread of emotion between people and across geographi-
cal areas indicates the type of organization needed for collective emotion which includes 
social sharing of emotion (Rimé, 2007), emotional contagion/entrainment and the coor-
dination of af ective expressions and displays (Collins, 2004). Network models under-
mine the sharp distinction between group-based emotions and collective emotions that 
is usually maintained by picturing individuals experiencing these emotions in isolation. 
Focusing on the individual in the foreground ignores features of interactions, assembly, 
and background context that af ord and sustain a sense of a widely shared feeling. 
 h e manner in which group-based emotions are expressed and talked about with oth-
ers is important to accounts of collective emotion because, as Rimé (2007) notes, emo-
tions are ot en re-experienced and more intense when they are shared (i.e., expressed to 
and discussed with others; see also Paez & Rimé, Chapter 14, this volume). Emphasizing 
interactions addresses inherent weaknesses of the aggregate model and is closer to what 
Pettigrove and Parsons (2012) describe as a network model of collective emotion in which 
“the relations between some nodes must be such as to produce characteristic responses 
in other nodes when confronted by certain actions, events, or states of af airs” (pp. 9–10). 
Using a network model, manifestations and distributions of pride (or happiness) in a com-
munity can still be considered in individual and aggregate terms even when the object is 
collective, but emergent network properties are emphasized (see also van der Löwe & 
Parkinson, Chapter 9, this volume). An additional feature of some network approaches is 
that an emotional atmosphere or climate that has an objective existence can be seen in the 
interactions between people, the symbols people display and the narratives that incorpo-
rate symbolic and other cultural resources. 
 A network model of collective emotion incorporates emotional heterogeneity and coor-
dination. Collective pride might be ascribed to a group if “these responses will involve a 
signii cant percentage of persons who make up the collective experiencing af ects of a 
particular sort” (Pettigrove & Parsons, 2012, p. 10)  and there is relatively limited resist-
ance by individuals or groups to the resulting emotional climate. A good example is the 
widespread interest, excitement, and pride that typically occurs in host countries during 
mega-sport events; namely, a positive mood which develops despite some protests, criti-
cisms, and misgivings. People can, of course, experience interpersonal dilemmas when 
resisting or challenging a positive climate and such resistance can af ect a group’s balance 
between solidarity and alienation (Schef , 2007). 
 It can also be dii  cult to avoid what Collins (2004) calls the common object of attention 
on these occasions. During the 2012 Olympics, for instance, residents of the UK living 
outside London found it dii  cult to avoid the media exposure to victories by “Team GB.” 
Moreover, ef orts to engage the public such as the Olympic Torch relay attracted large, 
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enthusiastic crowds and the routes were chosen to maximize interest in areas of the UK 
not directly involved in hosting teams or events and without any local representative com-
peting in the games. 
 When people focus on a common object or complex events their attention is sustained 
and the potential source of pride is typically experienced in what Salmela (2012) calls a 
“we” rather than an “I” mode of engagement (or emotional entrainment; Collins, 2004). 
In the case of collective pride, the whole group would be expected to react in similar 
ways to events that have an impact on the shared focus of attention or, more specii cally, 
a particular desired outcome. If in the group individual modes of relating to the event 
predominate, less coordination of peak experiences of positive emotion would proba-
bly occur. However, relating to an event predominantly in we-mode need not preclude 
individual emotional heterogeneity. When reacting to signii cant positive national events 
(e.g., winning a bid to host a mega-sport event), individual reactions include excitement, 
happiness, joy, euphoria, or pride. However, the group’s reactions would be expected to be 
more homogeneous with collective pride because the prevalence of national symbols and 
the readiness with which people can evoke national narratives implies group solidarity, 
unity, and continuity. 
 Cultural models of collective pride 
 A network model of collective pride might appear to be most appropriate because com-
plex cultural objects such as images, i lms, texts, documents, symbols, and structures are 
included as collective emotion “nodes” (Pettigrove & Parsons, 2012). However, the exam-
ple of a crowd watching an important national football team game can help to expose the 
limitations of a network account. For instance, when the team wins we can tell by looking 
at each member of the crowd that they all enjoy the victory (aggregative model), that they 
tend to celebrate with others in interaction rituals (network model), but they also adopt 
similar postures, gestures, expressive forms, and practices which draw upon an appropri-
ate cultural repertoire (cultural model). In addition, crowds have irreducible group-level 
properties which include noise, social activity, spatial dispersal (e.g., going to and occupy-
ing sites with symbolic signii cance to continue celebrations), and economic ef ects (e.g., 
increased spending, coni dence in the national economy, etc.). 
 h ere are further advantages to adopting a cultural model of collective pride in combi-
nation with some features of network models. For example, while features of interaction 
ritual theory (IRT; Collins, 2004)  were mentioned in relation to network models, IRT 
also demonstrates how complex practical, material, symbolic, and interactional arrange-
ments generate patterns of a collective emotion (i.e., including features of spread and 
duration). However, there are still points where the model can be improved and Collins 
(2012) has added an important element to IRT which is directly relevant to collective 
pride:  the inability to predict the outcome of some rituals. Specii cally, the analysis of 
“time-bubbles of nationalism” contrasts with earlier examples of sporting competitions in 
which the crowd experience appears to be an end in itself for ritual participants. h e fea-
ture connecting football games, political contests, and some group conl icts therefore is 
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the unpredictability of the outcome and this contributes to the mixture of emotions that a 
group experiences (e.g., of joy, satisfaction, pride, euphoria, relief that might “average out” 
if we consider only valence and include negative emotions such as frustration or boredom). 
Collins (2012) describes the typical experience as a “three-month solidarity-and-hysteria 
zone” (p. 4) and emphasizes that the heightened experience of such events is felt (from the 
inside) to be “qualitatively dif erent from ordinary life outside” (p. 4). 
 Although mega-sport events, national days, and other planned or foreseeable events 
can produce positive collective emotions, it is the unpredictability of some group-related 
outcomes that explains why “such moments in time have the emotion character of high 
drama; both tragic and joyous surprise” (p. 4). In situations of competition or conl ict 
with another group, there is no guarantee that the outcome will be what the group desires. 
Collins also argues that the “length of the high plateau” of mass solidarity is dependent 
on the “degree of state penetration” (p. 4) such that nations “where symbolic mobilisa-
tion is easily perceived throughout the society, sustain plateaus of national solidarity in 
the three-month range; but societies that are more fragmented and less state-penetrated 
sustain the plateau for a month or less” (p. 4). h is topic deserves more attention along 
with the proposal that there is a refractory period in which the collective emotion dissi-
pates and “people cannot experience the same intensity again for some time; they neces-
sarily have to come down” (p. 4). Such dynamic l uctuations in collective pride are not 
considered in aggregate models of collective emotion, except perhaps as negative cor-
relations between group-based pride and group-based shame. For example, research by 
van Hilvoorde, Elling, and Stokvis (2010) on national pride, national shame, and sporting 
events suggests that the results of the Dutch men’s football team in the 2008 European 
Football Championship “which were above expectation, may have af ected, or maybe trig-
gered national feelings of pride and temporarily suppressed feelings of shame” (p. 96; an 
issue of the relations between collective pride and collective shame which was examined 
in the section on “Network models of collective pride” but which is also explored in rela-
tion to collective hubris in the last section). 
 Culturally available forms of national narratives (Hallmann et  al., 2013; Sullivan, 
2009)  shape communication and expression of group achievements at both the micro 
and broadest macro levels. Adopting an alternative might be regarded as repressing any 
acknowledgement of a “we” mode of relating to an event or contributing to social disin-
tegration. A further possibility is that some of the ef ects of collective emotion may be 
beyond conscious awareness such as an unknown desire for national “subgroups” to unite. 
h e character of collective emotional events and their consequences evoke phenomeno-
logical concepts which do not appear to be emergent properties of a network. What “it 
is like” to experience a climate of collective pride can include coterminous feelings of 
solidarity. A further phenomenological feature of collective pride ot en includes a sense 
that the status of “our group” is elevated in the eyes of other competing groups. People 
sense that the focus or gaze of other groups is positive, approving, and perhaps even 
envious; although the latter example might indicate a widespread enjoyment of the high 
status of one’s group or coni dence that seems more like arrogance. In this respect, the 
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character of authentic collective pride is ot en distinct from genuinely collective hubris 
(i.e., as a group-level rather than group-based emotion). One indication that collective 
pride is based on grounds that can be described as authentic (i.e., justii ed, reasonable) 
is that the reactions of other groups embody their judgment that the performance or 
outcome is special and desirable. In contrast, with collective hubris the reported feelings 
are self-assertive but ot en in dei ance of or without any consideration of the views and 
interests of other groups. As Schef  (1994) has noted, experiences of collective arrogance 
or hubris at the level of national groups can be angry, negative, inconsiderate, lacking 
empathy, and even violent in a manner that has a basis in prior, usually unacknowledged, 
collective shame. However, it is an open question whether what is described here as col-
lective hubris might be better categorized as collective narcissism. Nevertheless, if this 
nascent account is correct, there is no simple continuum from joy (with an unacknowl-
edged or suppressed sense of the elevation of one’s group) and more boisterous, arrogant 
or jingoistic claims (i.e., temporary celebrations of superiority, triumph or victory) to 
extremes of collective hubris, rather there are dynamic relations between collective forms 
of pride, shame, guilt, and anger. Furthermore, authenticity itself needs to be elaborated 
with regard to complex normative, ideological, and political issues ― such as whether a 
group should feel and express pride on the basis of the achievements of most of the group, 
subgroups, or group representatives ― and must consider whether relations with imag-
ined or real other groups rel ect equal competition, unequal dominance or intractable 
conl ict (Bar-Tal, 2007). 
 Toward an interdisciplinary theory of collective pride 
and collective hubris 
 In the three contexts of group achievement, intergroup competition, and intractable con-
l ict, collective pride and collective hubris are likely to be displayed. It is unclear, however, 
the extent to which collective pride and collective hubris are to be regarded as dif er-
ent forms of the same “object.” Drawing upon the case of individual authentic pride and 
hubristic pride, although the idea that there are two types of pride has received wide-
spread acceptance there are also good reasons for dissent. A range of transgressions may 
lead to instances of ostensibly legitimate individual pride being used to characterize an 
individual’s emotions as anger and dei ance or to ascribe an arrogant, domineering char-
acter. Moreover, as Schef  indicates, what we might call collective pride due to the contexts 
in which it occurs may actually be collective anger, revenge, or a focus on dominance and 
status as a special group that has little to do with celebratory positive collective emotion. 
Accordingly, it is important to extend the caution about the “two facets-one thing” view 
of individual pride (Tracy & Robins, 2007) to collective pride by examining specii c cases 
and their contexts. 
 As previously noted, the prototype of an event that has a clear emotional ef ect on a 
group is ot en one in which there is a positive outcome for most group members even when 
variations in membership, commitment and context are taken into account. Candidates 
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for these types of events include winning and successfully hosting international sport-
ing competitions, election victories, praise from other important groups, and collective 
actions that result in social and political changes. Drawing carefully upon approaches 
to individual pride, it seems reasonable to assume that collective pride will occur when 
a group’s standards, rules and goals are reached (e.g., for the i rst time) or exceeded. In 
contrast, maintaining standards, rules, or goals suggests refusal to accept anything (e.g., 
performance) below this level or it may set up unrealistic expectations (e.g., of further 
international success). h e goals might be realistically expected to be short term although 
long-term commitments are also possible (i.e., instantiated across generations). For exam-
ple, large nation-building projects can become sources of pride and symbols of national 
progress; social changes may similarly rel ect the values and aspirations of a large group. 
Some of the outcomes that generate collective emotion may also be conceptualized in 
connection with dreams or desires because no group member may seriously believe that 
they will happen—when they do euphoria and disbelief are widespread. For example, 
the election of a black president in the USA seemed unlikely until Barack Obama’s vic-
tory in 2008. Collective pride here includes the possibilities of relatively quiet satisfaction, 
happy celebrations that incorporate group symbols, and occasions of collective ecstasy 
and euphoria. 
 While collective celebrations are mostly positive when a group achieves a desired status 
through the variety of means available to them (e.g., international achievements), collec-
tive celebrations can change rapidly rel ecting the complex situational dynamics between 
groups such as supporters and police. For example, at er the football team Atletico 
Madrid’s victory in the 2012 Europa League i nal, many fans rioted because police pre-
vented them from celebrating at the city’s Neptuno fountain. Although alcohol may have 
played a role it still appears that collective positive emotions were “converted” into anger 
when supporters perceived the police action as an af ront to their collective identity. One 
fan noted: “What we cannot allow is that at er a team from the capital, from Madrid won a 
European title, we are treated almost as terrorists or criminals” ( h e Guardian , 2012b). As 
suggested by Salmela (personal communication, January 21, 2012), it is important to note 
that their collective identity as Atletico fans may also be constituted by their rivalry with 
Real Madrid so that, on this occasion, having i nally reached a similar “title-winning” 
status, police action to prevent them celebrating as their rivals had previously was humili-
ating and unbearable. Instances of group celebrations that are antisocial and can be 
described as collective hubris or arrogance might therefore be transgressive only immedi-
ately following a victory. At that point, any collective anger or outrage will replace rather 
than extend positive collective pride. h us an abrupt transformation from celebratory 
mood (with some forms of exuberant or provocative celebration which are tolerated due 
to the exceptional nature of the achievement) to angry protest might only occur because 
a reaction to the celebration by another group evokes unacknowledged feelings of shame 
and humiliation (Schef , 1994, 2007). 
 A further example of the complex relationship between collective pride and collective 
shame concerns Germany’s success as a host of and competitor in the 2006 World Cup 
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which transformed the German public’s relationship to their country. Prior to 2006, the 
phrase “I’m proud to be German” was closely associated with right-wing values and dis-
playing national pride was taboo (i.e., internalized as profound discomfort in displaying a 
l ag or verbally expressing pride). Although some older television viewers were disturbed 
by images of large groups of Germans waving l ags during the World Cup (Sullivan, 
2009), a form of relaxed and inclusive “party patriotism” was widespread that bore no 
resemblance to the emotional atmosphere and extremes of nationalism during the Nazi 
era. h is is not to deny that collective hubris in the form of devaluation of others, exercis-
ing strength and power over others, or taking revenge against competing groups might 
all be enjoyed in some manner and even be fed by instances of positive collective pride; 
nevertheless, they are unlikely to occur without suppressing genuinely mixed collective 
emotions and cutting of  collective shame (e.g., of the sort that occurs when a country is 
excluded by others). 
 In conl ict situations, collective pride can be linked to prejudice and violence. In the 
context of the political struggles of the Arab Spring in 2011, Collins (2012) notes that 
“it is within such three-month bubbles of extreme collective attention upon a common 
identity and a shared danger that both precipitous ventures and violent atrocities are most 
likely to happen” (p. 4). It is for these reasons that collective pride continues to be linked 
to increases in prejudice and possibilities of hostility toward any group that opposes the 
group’s ambitions and interests. h ese cognitive and emotional features of collective 
pride are important because even positive and ostensibly inclusive celebrations of group 
achievements can reduce empathy for competing groups and encourage antisocial behav-
ior. Other cases of pride may focus on narratives of restoration of group status in com-
petitive situations (i.e., here group or national narratives may be more about maintaining 
certain values or a privileged status). 
 Examining collective pride in conl icts illustrates further complex group relations and 
background features of  collective emotional orientations (Bar-Tal, 2007)  “such as fear, 
hatred, or anger, [which] together with collective pride, increase ai  liation, solidarity, and 
cohesiveness among society members in view of the threat to individuals and to society 
at large” (p. 1442, brackets added). Bar-Tal summarizes the way in which solidarity and 
unity combine with other rhetorical and emotional strategies: “by justifying the goals of 
the conl ict and focusing on delegitimization, and the intransigence and violence of the 
opponent, as well as on being a victim, fear, hatred, and anger, the infrastructure implies 
the necessity to exert all the ef orts and resources of the society in the struggle against 
the enemy” (p. 1442). In such contexts, patriotism is a discursive variation on collective 
pride because it is connected with cultural practices of recognition (rather than celebra-
tion in the positive emotional sense) of heroic or sell ess sacrii ce in rituals of loss and 
remembrance. Collective pride is felt more in connection with the quiet recognition and 
celebration of characteristics that register persistence, determination, and survival rather 
than anything like joy or feelings of triumph. 
 Although genuinely positive collective pride can occur in conl ict situations, in many 
instances the phenomenology of symbolic and rhetorical evocations of pride (e.g., 
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through l ags and speeches) is not positive. An example of non-paradigmatic, nega-
tive, and assertive or dei ant forms of collective pride include displays of national pride 
and symbol solidarity in the USA following September 11, 2001 (Collins, 2004; Skitka, 
2005) because these are self-assertive and display support for national interests but are 
not necessarily positive in valence. Accounting for l ag displays on the grounds that 
“We love our country” can still be done in a manner that is dei ant rather than celebra-
tory (e.g., much like displaying a national l ag at a famous person’s funeral can convey 
meaning about their status to the nation but does not necessarily express a positive 
emotion). Increased displays of the Stars and Stripes in America at er the September 
11 World Trade Centre attacks were collective responses, however the shared feeling at 
the time was clearly not celebratory and positive. h us, even if a person attests that they 
acted on the basis of patriotism or nationalism rather than anger and hostility toward 
an “outgroup,” the action tendency was not to celebrate and the phenomenology was 
not pleasure or enjoyment. 
 If collective pride in a context of intractable conl ict is exemplii ed by Bar-Tal’s analysis 
of Israel, Pettigrove and Parson’s (2012) analysis of a role for collective pride provides a 
very dif erent account from the Palestinian perspective. h ey describe how construc-
tions of collective pride are a key part of the collective emotional orientation to the 
conl ict with Israel. For example, a 1973 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) docu-
ment notes: “To declare Palestinian identity no longer means that one is a ‘refugee’ or 
second-class citizen. Rather, it is a declaration that arouses pride, because the Palestinian 
has become the  i da’i or revolutionary who bears arms” (as cited in Pettigrove & Parsons, 
2012). Further nodes in a network of collective emotion for Palestinians include docu-
ments, museum exhibitions, commemorations, and public spaces which demonstrate the 
value of collective pride as the motivation to restore a genuinely collective self-esteem 
and to redress the ef ects of collective shame created by submitting to such humiliat-
ing objects “as refugee camps, checkpoints, and the separation barrier” (p.  22). Such 
variations are crucial to the type of cultural account advocated here which requires that 
the discrete emotion of collective pride and contrasting instances of collective hubris 
are always seen in dynamic relation to context and a potential cultural background of 
collective shame. 
 Conclusion 
 Collective pride is a predominantly positive and celebratory emotion that occurs in groups 
such as nations in response to a range of activities, projects, and practices. Aggregative, 
network, and cultural models were examined with a preference expressed for a form of 
IRT that could be used to understand the similarities and dif erences between feelings and 
manifestations of collective pride and collective hubris in contexts of group achievement, 
group competition, and intractable conl ict. Development of an interdisciplinary theory 
of collective pride and collective hubris therefore requires the inclusion of collective anger 
and collective shame as well as recognition that collective hubris has unique emotional 
contours. 
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